INTRODUCTION
Since the mid 1990s, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programmes have become quite popular among policymakers and policy advisers as effective and efficient means of reducing poverty in developing countries, mainly in Latin America. Currently, most countries in the region have some sort of CCT programme, including Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, Guatemala, El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and Costa Rica.
These programmes aim to alleviate poverty in the short run through the cash transfer, and to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty by fostering the accumulation of human capital. Hence they are based not only on income distribution but also on certain actions that households are required to take in order to receive the transfer. These actions, known as conditionalities or co-responsibilities, are usually related to children's attendance at school, regular visits to health centres by pregnant women and children, and the updating of immunisation cards. Some programmes also include family support initiatives that seek to promote autonomous income generation on the part of beneficiary households, as well as their social participation. Therefore, these programmes intend to reduce poverty not only by increasing household income but also by changing the behaviour of poor families.
Impact evaluations of CCT programmes in Latin America have revealed positive results in several dimensions. 1 Because of the way in which these evaluations are designed, however (even experimental assessments such as those undertaken for PROGRESA in Mexico 2 and the Red de Protección Social (RPS) in Nicaragua), one cannot disentangle in any simple way what can be attributed to the effect of the transfer itself and what is due to behavioural changes linked to the conditionalities, as well as to other programme components. Additionally, few studies have examined the externalities of CCT programmes. Externalities are likely to be present in such contexts because of the learning processes fostered by social interactions between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, and because of general equilibrium effects that influence local prices.
Understanding the impact of the conditionalities and the existence of externalities is an important step in reaching a better assessment of the black-box results of standard impact evaluations, and in providing policymakers with better information on the adequacy of their CCT programmes. Handa et al. (2009) mention that programme components such as conditionalities, which do not have a significant effect, may entail unnecessary costs, 3 whereas Lalive and Cattaneo (2009) point out that if there are externalities, the targeting of programmes matters for their effect.
This paper puts forward a methodology that aims to address both the estimation of externality effects and the full decomposition of the programme's impact into income effect and behavioural-change effect for cases where an experimental design is not necessarily available. The externality effect is basically handled with a multiple-treatment approach, like those proposed by Imbens (2000) , Lechner (2001) , and Hudgens and Halloran (2008) . 4 The decomposition of the average treatment effect is based on a semi-parametric approach, as in DiNardo et al. (1996) , which avoids misunderstandings caused by some kind of linearity. In particular, and in contrast to Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) , Rubalcava et al. (2004) , Gitter and Barham (2007) , and Handa et al. (2009) , the income expansion path is estimated nonparametrically and it guarantees that the identified behavioural-change effect does not come from the change in household income.
The data are from a household survey designed for the impact evaluation of the pilot phase of the Tekoporã programme in Paraguay. In addition, we used data from the programme's administrative records, which include the payment accounts, and from the Ficha Hogar, a small questionnaire used to gather information for the purposes of selecting beneficiary households. Using all these data we estimate the effect of Tekoporã on households' consumption and savings.
All the estimates and decompositions in this paper are made for the parameter of average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). It is worth mentioning that our methodology can be applied to both experimental and quasi-experimental designs, but the meaning of externality and the interpretation of the ATT estimates vary according to the comparison group being used. Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) , for instance, analyse the externality effect only on households that are not eligible to participate in PROGRESA. It is plausible, however, that externalities can also affect treated households. Thus, even when all households are covered by the programme, there is some externality that can either boost or attenuate its expected impact.
For this reason, we decompose the ATT into two components: the average participation effect on the treated (APT) and the average externality effect on the treated (AET). We also decompose each of these effects into three components: income effect, substitution effect, and unexplained effect. That is, changes in consumption can arise from changes in household income, marginal propensity to consume, or idiosyncratic autonomous consumption. The combination of the latter two effects can be regarded as a behavioural effect. 5 The results point to the presence of programme externalities within communities. If there were no interaction between households, the programme would increase treated households' consumption by 21 per cent and their savings by 31 per cent. These direct effects of participation are found to be strictly associated with the rise in income generated by the transfers. That is, an unconditional transfer would cause the same increase in household consumption and savings as the programme did. However, the indirect impact caused by externality attenuates the direct impact on consumption and boosts the direct impact on savings. Moreover, these indirect effects are entirely associated with changes in household behaviour according to our proposed decomposition. Finally, the income component of the programme has no effect on the consumption composition of treated household. Hence an unconditional transfer might not be effective in changing the consumption pattern of poor households.
Besides this introduction, this paper contains five other sections. The second section presents a brief review of the literature. The third describes the main features of Tekoporã and the sampling design of its evaluation, emphasising how the comparison groups are defined. The fourth section puts forward the methodology used to decompose the ATT into participation effect and externality effect, as well as the decomposition into income and behavioural-change effects. The fifth section presents the main results in terms of household consumption and savings. The sixth section presents the conclusions.
WHY MIGHT THE EFFECT OF CCT PROGRAMMES GO BEYOND INCOME TRANSFER?
The main difference between unconditional and conditional cash transfer programmes is that the former only seek to relax poor households' budget constraint, while the latter also seek to change the households' behaviour in terms of budget and time allocations. That is, while it is expected that unconditional programmes only have an income effect on the outcome of interest, one may expect that conditional programmes have both an income effect and a substitution effect; the sum of these two effects gives the total effect of the programme.
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Thus it should be expected that the conditional transfer is not like other ordinary incomes, having a distinct effect on household decisions. Hoddinott and Skoufias (2004) , for instance, state that the income effect itself explains about 50 per cent of the total positive impact on consumption found in the PROGRESA evaluation. The remaining impact might be attributed to one of the conditionalities of the programme: attendance at talks on health issues (pláticas). 7 They also show that PROGRESA had a positive externality effect on non-beneficiaries' acquisition of calories from fruits, vegetables and animal products. Then they speculate that the information provided by pláticas may have spilled over to non-beneficiaries.
Like Hoddinott and Skoufias in Mexico, Attanasio and Mesnard (2006) , Maluccio and Flores (2005) , Schady (2006) and Oliveira et al. (2007) show that CCT programmes have changed the consumption basket of households in Colombia, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Brazil, respectively. In Colombia and Nicaragua, Attanasio and Mesnard, and Maluccio and Flores, find that the food consumption of beneficiary households grew as much as their aggregate consumption, which may be more than the Engel curve predicts. On the basis of results obtained by Adato and Roopnaraine (2004, apud Maluccio and Flores, 2005) , Maluccio and Flores presume that part of the impact of RPS on food consumption stems from the fact that some community agents (promotoras) frequently ask beneficiaries to show purchase receipts after transfers have been made. In Ecuador and Brazil, Schady, and Oliveira et al., show that the programmes have affected the expenditure share of households, even though there is no significant impact on aggregate level of consumption.
All this evidence suggests that CCT programmes have had significant impacts on the Engel curve of beneficiary households. Specifically, these households have been encouraged by the programmes to change their behaviour in terms of consumption patterns. Such evidence may distinguish CCT programmes from other types of targeted cash transfers, whose benefitaccording to Case and Deaton (1998) and Edmonds (2002) -is shown to be used like other income by households. 8 Besides those reasons suggested by Hoddinott and Skoufias (the effect of pláticas) and Maluccio and Flores (the effect of promotoras), there are some other explanations for the behaviour effect of CCT programmes. The first explanation is that these programmes are usually female-based, giving preference to the mother to receive the transfer. 9 According to Attanasio and Lechene (2002) and Schady and Rosero (2007) respectively, both PROGRESA in Mexico and the Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) in Ecuador have improved the bargaining position of women in beneficiary households, giving them greater capacity to influence decisions on expenditures. These authors, along with Rubalcava et al. (2004) , show that the programmes have consequently changed the households' consumption pattern toward goods that benefit children, since more money is in the hands of women.
Although Handa et al. (2009) confirm that PROGRESA has improved the bargaining position of some women, they do not find that this improvement has a significant effect on household consumption. Similarly, Gitter and Barham (2007) do not find evidence that the impact of Nicaragua's RPS on school enrolment and expenditures is driven by the greater power of women in their households. They find that the CCT benefit has an effect on schooling which is significantly higher than the effect of other earnings. In Mexico, Rubalcava et al. (2004) also show that the effect of the CCT benefit on the expenditure shares of education, child clothing and meat is significantly higher than the effect of a general income increase. Gitter and Barham, as well as Rubalcava et al., suggest that the differentiated elasticity of the CCT benefit derived not only from the change in intra-household bargaining power but also from other programme components, such as conditionalities and complementary initiatives.
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By estimating a similar model, Handa et al. (2009) seem to contradict the findings of Rubalcava et al. (2004) . Handa et al. show that the PROGRESA benefit has no effect on education spending and makes no difference in terms of child clothing with respect to other earnings. Hence they conclude that the PROGRESA transfer is treated as general income by the households and its effects would not differ from those of an unconditional transfer. It is worth mentioning, however, that there are some critical differences between the models of Handa et al. and Rubalcava et al. The former authors use instrumental variables to predict both the per capita transfer and per capita income, 11 estimate the effects on expenditure levels, and adopt a linear model with constant elasticities. The latter authors are not concerned about any source of endogeneity, estimate the effects on expenditure shares, and adopt a non-linear model with a flexible spline. Regarding this latter point, Rubalcava et al. actually show that ignoring nonlinearities in the income effect could lead to misleading results.
To test the role of conditionalities, Ruiz-Arranz et al. (2006) compare the effects of PROGRESA with PROCAMPO, another cash transfer programme in Mexico that benefits male farmers and whose conditionality is linked to agricultural production. They conclude that, on the one hand, cash transfers related to production increase food security through productive investments and have a higher impact on the probability of households eating meat and fish. On the other hand, cash transfers related to human capital investments have the same effect on food security, but by means of market purchases, and a higher effect on the probability of consuming fruits, vegetables, dairy products and processed foods.
The most evident and precise testing for the importance of conditionalities on CCT programmes is probably that of de Brauw and Hoddinott (2007) . They take advantage of the fact that some beneficiaries of PROGRESA did not receive the forms needed to monitor their children's attendance at school. Then they show that the absence of monitoring significantly reduces the probability of school attendance, particularly in the transition from primary to secondary school. This result is similar to that obtained by Bourguignon et al. (2003) for Bolsa Escola in Brazil. The difference is that Bourguignon et al. adopt an ex-ante impact evaluation approach but they also identify a strong effect of conditionality on school attendance, in contrast to a muted effect of the transfer on current poverty. Since the conditionality has an effect on schooling, it may also affect other allocation decisions within treated households.
As regards the externalities of CCT programmes, Angelucci and De Giorgi (2009) present a clear result that PROGRESA has had a positive impact on the food consumption of households that are ineligible for the programme. This impact, however, is not caused by a higher demand in the local economies and a consequent rise in the ineligibles' earnings. That indirect effect is related to risk-sharing promoted by community-level networks. They argue that the programme has increased food consumption by means of loans and transfers from eligible to ineligible households. Furthermore, Angelucci et al. (2009) explicitly show that this indirect effect on consumption is significant only among ineligible households embedded in family networks. Bobonis and Finan (2009) and Lalive and Cattaneo (2009) show that PROGRESA has also had positive externality effects on school enrolment and attendance, respectively. Their hypothesis is that externalities are promoted by endogenous peer effects as a result of social interaction between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. In the case of Bobonis and Finan, the closer the child's household is to the eligibility cut-off point, the higher the peer effect. Lalive and Cattaneo, however, highlight that peer effects also affect eligible children, boosting the impact of the programme. Moreover, they claim that peer effects arise because parents learn from each other about the ability of their children. 12 Since CCT programmes also have significant impacts on health (Gertler, 2004; Attanasio et al., 2005) , this might be another source of externality, one that affects the outcome of nonbeneficiary households by reducing epidemics in the population as a whole. Miguel and Kremer (2004) , for instance, show that deworming treatment reduces worm burdens and then increases school attendance among both treated and untreated children in Kenya. Finally, another hypothesis for the presence of externalities in CCT programmes is that given the lack of understanding about how eligibility is defined, some households may emulate the behaviour of the beneficiaries in an attempt to show that they too could qualify for the programme.
PROGRAMME DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION DESIGN

THE PILOT OF THE TEKOPORÃ PROGRAMME
Tekoporã is a CCT programme that has been scaled up in Paraguay. Like other CCT programmes, it was designed in the context of a national strategy to fight poverty, as part of the general effort to meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The programme seeks to reduce extreme poverty by giving direct cash transfers to poor households with children, and to lessen potential future poverty by encouraging investments in human and social capital. The transfers are conditional on school attendance, regular visits to health centres and periodic immunisations. The programme also includes a family support component that, among other objectives, should increase the household's productive capacity and social participation. 13 The pilot programme consisted of a monthly transfer to extremely poor families in rural areas with children up to the age of 15 and/or a pregnant woman. These households were entitled to a benefit of 30,000 guaranies (US$ 6) per child or pregnant woman up to a limit of four children per household; this was in addition to a basic transfer of 60,000 guaranies (US$ 12) per month. Eligible households could thus receive between 90,000 and 180,000 guaranies per month (US$ 18 and US$ 36). To identify eligible households, a non-monetary quality of life index (ICV) was adopted as the targeting tool. Such an approach has been common throughout Latin America, where poverty monitoring often relies on a composite index of unsatisfied basic needs. The ICV varies between zero and 100 and is composed of variables related to housing conditions; access to public services and utilities such as water, electricity, garbage collection and telephone; healthcare and insurance; the education of the head of household and spouse; school achievement of children aged between six and 24; the occupation of the head of the household; ownership of durable goods; and the household's demographic composition. Unlike the IPG, the ICV does not use any monetary variables.
Households are eligible for the programme if they meet all of the following conditions: (1) have children under 15 years of age or pregnant women; (2) live in the priority areas of the programme, namely the poorest districts in the country according to the IPG; and (3) have an ICV of below 40 points. 15 
DATABASE
In the absence of a baseline survey, information on household characteristics before the programme started comes from the database originated by Ficha Hogar, which was the instrument used to collect information on the variables used to calculate the ICV-the main indicator for the selection of beneficiary households.
In this pilot phase, the Ficha Hogar was fielded through a census in the poorest areas of the selected districts, in addition to the poorest areas of two other districts-Moises Bertoni in the department of Caazapá, and Tucuati in the department of San Pedro-that did not take part in the pilot. Furthermore, potentially eligible households that were not in the poorest areas of the districts for the pilot could also be included in the programme registry as a result of the so-called "demand process"-namely, on the basis of their demand to have information on their living conditions provided to the Ficha Hogar. In total, 7,990 households were screened by the census and 1,827 by demand.
The evaluation survey went to the field between January and April 2007, based on a sample of 1,401 households derived from the Ficha Hogar. The response rate of the survey was 78 per cent-that is, 1,089 households were actually interviewed. The questionnaire used in the follow-up survey encompassed all the information available in the Ficha Hogar, in order to reproduce the baseline information. It also included important questions related to outcome indicators that were not covered by the Ficha Hogarsuch as consumption and school attendance-and it had a module on the beneficiaries' perception of the programme.
COMPARISON GROUP
In any impact evaluation, the comparison group must be as similar as possible to the beneficiary (or treated) group except that it does not participate in the programme. For Tekoporã, it was possible to identify two comparison groups: (1) non-beneficiaries living in the other two districts covered by the census (Ficha Hogar) but not by the pilot project; and (2) non-beneficiaries living in the same five districts as the beneficiaries. Furthermore, both groups of households were divided into eligibles (which had children and an ICV below 40) and ineligibles (which also had children but with an ICV equal to or greater than 40). Households that did not have children or pregnant women were automatically excluded from the dataset, as were those households that registered with an incomplete interview. Table 1 presents the reasons for the non-participation in the programme of the potential comparison group in the Ficha Hogar database. The largest group comprises households in the two districts not participating in the pilot (39 per cent). In these districts, more than 90 per cent (1,160 of 1,284) of the households with children had an ICV below 40. It is worth mentioning that those two districts were meant to be included in the pilot, but because of budget constraints the programme could only cover five districts. To keep the geographical balance between departments, one district from each department was excluded from the pilot.
The second largest group of non-beneficiaries consists of households that lived in the districts of the pilot but were "overlooked" or "forgotten" by the programme (35 per cent). In this case, about 66 per cent (542 of 708) were eligible for the programme (ICV below 40). One possible reason for this administrative error is related to the change in the cut-off point of the eligibility criteria. As the cut-off point was increased from 25 to 40 when registration for the programme had already begun, it is possible that in some neighbourhoods, potential beneficiaries whose ICV was between 25 and 40 did not receive an invitation to register. The other reasons provided in Table 1 are related to: (1) rejection by the selection committees, whose function was to double-check the list of potential beneficiaries yielded by the ICV ranking; (2) potential beneficiaries living in settlements controlled by the landless movement, who were waiting for permission from their leaders to take part in the programme; and (3) households that were identified as non-poor (because of their degree of economic autonomy) in later checks.
We chose to use the two largest groups of untreated households as our comparison groups in this evaluation-that is, households in districts outside the pilot and households overlooked by the programme. This allows us to make two types of comparison in the impact estimation: "between-district" and "within-district". The other groups were excluded from the evaluation because they were not treated owing to specific unobservable (or hard-to-control-for) reasons.
Thus it was possible to define four types of comparison groups registered in the dataset. These groups consist of eligible and ineligible households in both districts-with and without the programme. Note that the districts excluded from the pilot are neither geographically concentrated nor distinct from the participating districts. Table 2 confirms that, in general, there are no great differences between them. Note: * all households with complete interview in the census.
METHODOLOGY
ESTIMATION STRATEGY
In order to measure the programme's impact on an observable outcome, we need to estimate the difference between the outcome with the treatment (participating in the programme) and the outcome without the treatment (not participating) for the same household. When these differences are calculated for all treated households under the necessary conditions, we can obtain the ATT.
Formally, assume that
indicates that the treatment, or programme benefit, is offered to household i and
would indicate the outcome of interest for household i when the treatment is not offered, whereas ( )
would be the outcome for household i receiving the programme benefit. Then, the effect of intention to treat on the treated (ITT) can be defined as (Heckman et al., 1999) :
where [] .
E is the expectation function.
However, we cannot observe the same household in both states (participating and not participating) at same time. Thus we may assume that the outcome in the absence of treatment is orthogonal between the treatment and comparison groups. This can be assumed if the treatment is randomly assigned. Otherwise, a weaker condition, in which the conditional outcome in the absence of treatment is orthogonal to the treatment assignment, should be assumed: (Rubin, 1978; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) .
On the other hand, the ITT estimate will be a consistent estimator for the ATT effect only if the treatment assignment, or intention of treatment, is perfectly correlated with the actual treatment. Thus even when condition (4.2) of selection on observables holds, we should also assume that there are no contamination or externality effects spilling over onto the control group, no alternative treatment offered to the control group, and no drop-out from the treatment group (Heckman et al., 1999; Miguel and Kremer, 2004; Sobel, 2006; Rosenbaum, 2007; Hudgens and Halloran, 2008) . This assumption is what Rubin (1980 Rubin ( , 1986 calls Stable-UnitTreatment-Value Assumption (SUTVA).
In the case of CCT programmes, drop-out from the treatment group is not a large problem because usually there are very few households that do not accept the benefit. Non-compliance with the conditionalities is a more common problem, but its effect is implicit when one evaluates a programme's effectiveness. Neither is the existence of alternative treatment a significant problem, since its beneficiaries are usually either included in the treatment group or excluded from the sample.
Externality of the treatment, however, is indeed an issue to be considered, for two reasons. The first is the contamination of the control group, which can bias the ATT estimates. If we did not distinguish the comparison group between those living in treated communities and those living in other communities, the SUTVA would be violated-that is, the comparison group would be contaminated by households that have also been affected by the programme. The second reason for estimating externality is the interest in assessing its effect, in order to gain a better understanding of the role of social interactions in the programme's effectiveness.
Assessing Participation and Externality Effects
In order to identify and disentangle the externality effect, we need to distinguish between the two comparison groups: those in treated communities and those in untreated communities. 
indicates the "within-community" comparison group, while ( )
indicates the "between-community" comparison group. For all treated households, i D is certainly equal to one, which leads to ( )
. Note that there is no treated household in untreated communities, ( )
, but this counterfactual case is estimated under some identification assumptions.
An underling assumption is that externalities only take place in communities participating in the programme-that is, there is no spillover between communities. Then the average participation effect on the treated (APT), which represents the effect of the programme when there is no externality, is given by:
whereas the average externality effect on the treated (AET), which represents only the effect of the externalities promoted by the programme, is given by:
We can represent the outcome by the following linear function:
This function form assumes that there is no specific effect stemming from the interaction between participation and externality. That is, the externality effect is equal in both cases when the household is treated and when it is untreated; likewise, the participation effect is the same regardless of the existence of externalities. This assumption facilitates the decomposition of the ATT effect, because it implies that
Moreover, it seems to be more reasonable than the assumption that the externality effect on the treatment group is null.
Then the ATT effect, which represents the total effect of the programme on treated households, is given by the sum of both effects (4.3) and (4.4) . Using (4.6) we can write it as:
One condition for the identification of these effects is the following orthogonally assumption:
It means that the treatment assignment and the potential outcomes are independent conditional on the pre-treatment observed variables, i X , and the community, i D .
Similarly, we should also assume that the community choice is orthogonal to the potential outcomes conditioned on the observed variables, i X , and the household treatment assignment, i T :
Since one actually only observes (4.8) and (4.9) are required to guarantee a consistent approximation of the counterfactual, missing, potential outcomes, and then make the following equalities hold: and (4.11) [
(4.12)
One way to obtain those estimators is approximating the conditional means by estimating the following linear function :
However, if the dimension of i X is too large and some critical covariates are possibly correlated with the errors in the equations above, it may be difficult to estimate this regression function accurately.
The well-known solution to control for treatment selection on many observable characteristics is to reduce the set of covariates, i X , to a scalar by means of a first-stage estimation. That is, we can estimate a propensity score, ( ) [ ] (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) .
The implementation of the propensity score, however, requires an additional assumption:
This assumption is called the "balancing property" and can be empirically verified. Yet in the case of distinct comparison groups or multiple treatments, the balancing property is not as simple as the conventional (Lechner, 2001) . The treatment group must be balanced to both the withincommunity comparison group and the between-community comparison group.
Moreover, condition (4.9) requires that we estimate not only the probability of each unit sample being treated but also the probabilities of belonging to the between-and withincommunity comparison groups. These probabilities can be estimated using a multinomial or multivariate regression model, where the probability of being in within-community comparison group, ( ) [ ]
, is also calculated.
In the second stage, adjusting for the propensity score removes the bias associated with differences in the observed covariates in the treated and comparison groups Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) . One approach, based on Horvitz and Thompson's (1952) theorem, consists of weighting treated and comparison observations to make them representative of the population of interest-in our case, the treatment group (Hahn, 1998; Hirano et al., 2003) . In this approach, we characterise p τ , e τ and ATT τ through the following moment equations, respectively: 
is the probability of being in the treatment group and
is the probability of being in the within-community comparison group. 
As Robins and Rotnizky (1995) point out, if either the model of conditional means (4.13) or the model based on the propensity score (4.15)-(4.17) are correctly specified, the resulting estimator will be consistent. For this reason, Hirano and Imbens (2001) propose a flexible approach combining both models. Hirano and Imbens's estimator is based on weighted least square estimation of equation (4.13), where the control variables on the right-hand side are a subset of i X . 20 Based on the estimators (4.18)- (4.20) , the estimated weight, applied in these regressions, is given by:
where i Z is a subset of i X that balances both propensities scores.
Assessing Income Effect and Behavioural-Change Effects
Besides looking at the externality effect, this paper also proposes a methodology to disentangle the effects of increasing income and the changes induced by behavioural change. Essentially, we propose to decompose each of the APT, AET and ATT parameters into income effect, substitution effect and unexplained effect, using a methodology analogous to those presented by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) , DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) , and Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2007) . The income effect represents the change in the outcome, i Y , predicted by the income expansion path when the household income increases. The substitution effect represents the effect of changes in the income expansion path on the outcome. That is, given the same level of income, this component assesses the effect of change in the income elasticity promoted by the programme. The unexplained component represents the effect of the programme that is related to neither the income level nor the income elasticity. This component measures an autonomous change in the outcome caused by the programme. Then the sum of the two latter components represents the behavioural-change effect-that is, the component that is not explained by the income increase.
In order to simplify, let ( ) ( ) 
. Thus the only thing that changes is the income expansion path,
,T D g . Finally, the distribution of
only changes with respect to the error function, ( )
From (4.23), we can rewrite the ATT parameter (4.12) as follows: 
is the total substitution effect of the programme on the treated, and
is the total unexplained effect of the programme on the treated.
Likewise, the APT and AET parameters can be written respectively as follows: In order to estimate all these parameters, the first step is to obtain an estimate for the (Kakwani, 2000) .
Under assumptions (4.8) and (4.9) τ , we subtract the respective estimated income and substitution effects from the estimated ATT.
Since all components are estimated using predicted variables, estimation of the standard errors is not straightforward. It requires a correction as suggested by Schafer and Schenker (1997) . Since standard errors for estimates based on propensity score are likewise not straightforward, we opt to calculate all the standard errors using a nonparametric bootstrap, with samples taken independently within each group. It is worth mentioning that once a new sample is drawn, all the steps in the decomposition are repeated, including the Kernel regressions. The only step that is not repeated after resampling is the estimation of the propensity score.
ESTIMATING THE MULTINOMIAL PROPENSITY SCORE
As already mentioned, since there are two distinct comparison groups, we should estimate a multinomial propensity score that balances the covariates between the treatment and comparison groups. Such an assumption can actually be tested, checking whether the differences in observable characteristics between groups are significant after the propensity score weighting. Once the differences are not significant, it does not matter which link function we use.
In this paper, the propensity score of "multiple" treatment is obtained using a multinomial logistic model as suggested by Lechner (2001) , which yields the estimated probability of being in each group. Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients of this model. The covariates, as well as their interactions, are chosen with the aim of satisfying the balancing property for a larger set of pre-treatment variables. This set, obtained from the Ficha Hogar, includes all components of the ICV (the official targeting index) and other variables not considered in the calculation of that index, such as department and area (urban/rural) of residence, possession of identity card by some household members, number of years living in the same neighbourhood, number of household members, sex of household head, and per capita income. Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
On the basis of the estimated propensity score, we restrict the "weighted" or "matched" sample to those households within a common support. This common support is defined by the probability of being in each of the three groups between 1 per cent and 98 per cent. Note: *** signif. different from treatment at 1%, ** signif. different from treatment at 5%, * signif. different from treatment at 10%. ''' signif. different from W-C comparison at 1%, '' signif. different from W-C comparison at 5%, ' signif. different from W-C comparison at 10%. Table 4 presents the mean of covariates for each group before and after the propensity score weighting. For all variables, there is at least one group that is significantly different from another. After the propensity score weighting and restriction to the common support, however, the differences almost disappear in terms of mean. The only significant differences that remain are in the department of residence and in the number of children, health and education components of the ICV. For this reason, these variables are also included in the regression adjustment-that is on the right-hand side of equation (4.13) . Figure 1 shows how the propensity score weighting changes the distribution of the ICV for the comparison groups. In the panel on the left with the unweighted distributions, the comparison groups' distributions have a longer right tail than the treatment group's: the probability of higher ICV values is greater in the comparison groups, mainly in the withincommunity group. The panel on the right shows how the weighting scheme changes the ICV distribution of the comparison groups so that it resembles the distribution of the treatment group. The weighting scheme thus approximates the groups not only in terms of means, as shown in Table 4 , but also in terms of the whole distribution. The ICV is actually the main determinant of participation in the Tekoporã programme, and no significant difference between the treated and untreated groups is found after the propensity score weighting. Thus we can assume conditions (4.8) and (4.9) of selection of households based on observables and achieve consistent results. With regard to the adequacy of propensity score methods to evaluate CCT programmes, Handa and Diaz (2006) and Handa and Maluccio (2010) show that these methods are capable of reproducing the experimental results for the cases of PROGRESA and RPS, respectively, even in a non-experimental setting.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This section is divided into three parts. The first presents descriptive statistics for the treatment group, the within-community comparison group and the between-community comparison group. The second encompasses the estimates of Tekoporã's average effect (ATT), participation effect (APT), and externality effect (AET) on consumption. The third shows the estimated decompositions of these three effects into income, substitution and unexplained effects.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The decompositions proposed in this paper are applied to investigate the effect of the Tekoporã programme on household consumption and expenditures. In particular, we estimate the effect on total expenditures on consumption, expenditures on food, and the saving rate. Expenditures, which include self-production and other non-monetary expenditures, are measured by logarithm of the per capita amount. The saving rate is defined as the difference between the logarithms of monthly net income and expenditures on consumption (Deaton, 1997) -that is, the proportion of income in cash and in kind, discounting taxes and transfers to others, that a household receives more (or less) than its expenditures on consumption. We also estimate the effect on consumption basket composition, assessed by the share of consumption spent on distinct items-for example, the shares of expenditures on food, education, health, child clothing, adult clothing and housing. Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics for those outcome variables post-treatment. 24 Note that the total consumption level, as well as food consumption, is about 9 per cent higher in the comparison groups. The saving rate, on the other hand, is much higher in the treatment group than in the other groups. Current income in the treated households is almost 3 per cent higher than their consumption, whereas the comparison households spend on average more than they earn. Moreover, the mean saving rate in the within-community comparison group is significantly higher than in the other comparison group, which cannot be affected by the programme in any way. Note: *** signif. different from treatment at 1%, ** signif. different from treatment at 5%, * signif. different from treatment at 10%. ''' signif. different from W-C comparison at 1%, '' signif. different from W-C comparison at 5%, ' signif. different from W-C comparison at 10%.
Although mean food consumption is greater in the comparison group, its mean food share does not differ significantly from the treatment group's. Among households in this sample, about 80 per cent of spending is on food. The mean food share in the within-community comparison group, though, is significantly greater than in the between-community group. The shares of adult clothing and housing expenditures in the latter group, on the other hand, are significantly higher than in the former comparison group. On average, among these households about 5 per cent of spending is on housing and 1 per cent on adult clothing. The mean share of child clothing is also around 1 per cent in the comparison groups. In the treatment group, however, this mean share is almost 3 per cent. Finally, households in the three groups spend about 1 per cent on education and 4 per cent on health. Table 6 presents the estimates for the average participation effect on the treated (APT), average externality effect on the treated (AET), and average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), which is the sum of the former effects. If the programme had no externality effect, it would increase the level of consumption by 21 per cent, food consumption by 15 per cent, and by 0.7 percentage points the share of adult clothing among treated households. But the externality effects of the programme on these outcomes are all negative. Hence the externality cancels out the participation effect, making the total effect of the programme on these outcomes null or even negative, as on food consumption. Likewise, the programme would reduce the share of food consumption by 4 percentage points in the absence of externality. Nonetheless, given the small externality effect on this outcome, the total effect of the programme on the food share of treated households is insignificant. Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
PARTICIPATION, EXTERNALITY AND TOTAL EFFECTS OF TEKOPORÃ
Standard errors, between parentheses, calculated using 1,000 bootstrap resampling.
Even though the participation effect on food consumption is positive, the negative participation effect on food share is explained by a higher increase in other types of expenditure, such as on child and adult clothing. Unlike the effect on share of adult clothing, the participation effect on share of child clothing is not offset by the externality effect, which makes the total effect on this outcome about 18 percentage points.
An externality effect that boosts the participation effect is on savings. Each component contributes about 50 per cent to the total impact of the programme on the saving rate, which is at 31 per cent. The positive externality on savings explains why the externality on consumption is negative. The programme encourages an increase in the saving rate even if the household was not being treated but was in a treated community. This externalised behaviour makes households reduce consumption in order to save more of their income.
INCOME EFFECT AND BEHAVIOURAL CHANGE EFFECTS OF TEKOPORÃ
To understand the previous results better, we can also decompose those effects into income effect, substitution effect and unexplained effect. In the tables in this section, the first column shows the estimated marginal income effect (MIE), which is the impact that the programme would have if it only caused an increase in household income. This effect represents the impact of the programme if it were unconditional and did not have other components besides income transfer. The next column presents the income effect (IE) taking into consideration that the income expansion path has also been changing-that is, it gives the contribution of income increase per se to the programme impact. The third column shows the substitution effect (SE), which is the contribution of changes in income elasticity, taking into account that household income has been increasing. The last column presents the unexplained effect (UE), which is the contribution of changes that are not related to either income level or elasticity. Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Standard errors, between parentheses calculated using 1,000 bootstrap resampling. MIE = Marginal Income Effect, IE = Income Effect, SE = Substitution Effect, UE = Unexplained Effect. Table 7 presents the estimated decomposition of the average participation effect (APT). Assuming that the programme would have no externality, its effects on consumption and savings would be wholly explained by the income increase. The effects on consumption composition, on the other hand, are entirely explained by changes in the income elasticity. If there were no interaction between households, therefore, an unconditional transfer would cause the same increase in household consumption and savings as the programme did. Unlike the programme, however, this unconditional transfer would cause no significant change in the consumption basket composition. Table 8 presents the estimated decomposition of the AET. As expected, the externality of the programme is not caused by its transfer, but by the behavioural change that it promotes. According to the method of decomposition, the income effect would be externalised if the transfer had a multiplicative effect on the community. Hence we can state that the cash transfer by itself has no effect on aggregate demand, at least in the case of Tekoporã. Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Standard errors, between parentheses calculated using 1,000 bootstrap resampling. MIE = Marginal Income Effect, IE = Income Effect, SE = Substitution Effect, UE = Unexplained Effect. Table 9 shows the estimates for the ATT decomposition, which can be read as the sum of estimates for each outcome and component presented in the previous tables. In terms of consumption and saving, the income component, which is mostly related to the effect of participation, is positive: the cash transfer per se has a direct positive effect on consumption and savings. On the other hand, the programme also has a substitution effect, which is mostly related to externalities. It has an effect on household behaviour that indirectly cancels out the income effect on consumption and boosts the income effect on savings.
As shown earlier, the income component contributes to neither the participation effect nor the externality effect in terms of expenditure share. Thus it is expected that the programme's identified impact on the share of child clothing expenditures is entirely explained by the substitution effect. Note: *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Standard errors, between parentheses calculated using 1,000 bootstrap resampling. MIE = Marginal Income Effect, IE = Income Effect, SE = Substitution Effect, UE = Unexplained Effect.
CONCLUSION
This paper deals with two relevant issues in discussions of the impacts of CCT programmes. First, we discuss the existence of externality and propose to decompose the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) into two components: the average participation effect on the treated (APT), which represents the direct impact of the programme; and the average externality effect on the treated (AET), which represents the programme's indirect impact. The expected direction and magnitude of the indirect effect are quite pertinent to the decision on programme coverage. If the externality has an effect contrary to what is intended, then the higher the coverage, the worse the outcomes. Otherwise, a higher coverage would improve the expected outcomes. 25 Second, we decompose those three parameters into income effect, substitution effect and unexplained effect. We can then understand whether the programme impact is due either to the relaxation of the household budget constraint (like a pure income effect) or to changes in the household behaviour triggered by conditionalities and other components of the programme. As argued by Handa et al. (2009) , conditionalities, as well as other components, are a substantial part of the programmes' budgets and are hard to monitor. They should really contribute to the programmes' impact in order to be justified as a component.
After applying the suggested methodology, we find that in addition to its direct effects, the Tekoporã programme also has indirect effects or externalities. Thus if we did not differentiate the comparison group between those living in treated communities and those living in other communities, we would violate the Stable-Unit-Treatment-Value Assumption (SUTVA), which, according to Rubin (1980 Rubin ( , 1986 , is required to estimate causal effects. The comparison group would be contaminated by households that have also been affected by the programme. Furthermore, we show that externalities are entirely associated with changes in household behaviour. This suggests that the programme has an indirect effect, not because it has a multiplicative effect on aggregate demand, but because there may be a social interaction component behind this effect.
If there were no externality, the programme would increase household consumption significantly. This effect, however, is offset by households' behavioural response to the programme. Angelucci and Di Giorgi (2006) find different results in terms of consumption for PROGRESA. But they assess externality only for a group of non-eligible households, which somehow are able to profit from the extra income in their community. In the case of Tekoporã, the role of "family guides" is also worth mentioning. They are meant to help households plan their budgets better. In a seasonal, agricultural economy, budget planning means precautionary savings. Thus the "saving message" transmitted by the family guides may have spilled over to other poor households, causing them to reduce consumption.
While the impact on savings is caused partly by the increase in income, the impact on consumption composition is entirely explained by the behavioural change promoted by the programme. In contrast to the finding of Handa et al. (2009) , this result suggests that, at least in the case of Tekoporã, the cash transfer plays no role in changing the consumption pattern, but conditionalities and family guides' work do. The programme directly encourages beneficiary households to reduce relative expenditure on food and increase the share of child and adult clothing. Nonetheless, the only effect that remains taking externality into account is on the share of child clothing. Because of its other components beyond cash, therefore, the programme is effective in improve the share of expenditure going to children.
